# Development state

Checkpoint: 2026-09-15 end of day. Branch: `main`. Latest commit:
`586ff8f` (`checkpoint: integrate authenticated transports`). The working tree
is clean. Config and client-ID changes are included in this commit. The
resumed recovery-only assignments after this commit made no edits.

## Implemented behavior

- The package has a reusable Rust library and a thin binary. Integration tests
  import the library; module unit tests run once in the library test target.
- Client and server runtimes support authenticated direct UDP, QUIC DATAGRAM,
  HTTP/3 CONNECT-UDP with HTTP Datagrams, and TLS/TCP length-framed fallback.
  TLS client connections use normal certificate-chain and hostname verification.
  Shared-secret authentication precedes encrypted server backend-session
  activation.
- Client `auto` follows configured order and bounded probes, stops on
  authentication rejection, and reconnects with jittered 250 ms–30 s backoff.
  Successful connections reset the backoff. Client control supports explicit
  reconnect.
- The server runs enabled listeners concurrently, rejects incompatible UDP
  listener port conflicts, aggregates listener/session statistics, and gives
  sessions isolated backend UDP sockets. Admission limits cover sessions,
  per-IP sessions, pending handshakes, and authentication attempts.
- The Unix control socket uses a private runtime directory and mode `0600`,
  refuses an active socket, and removes only a verified stale socket. `status`,
  `stats`, and `shutdown` are supported; `reconnect` is client-only. Config and
  certificate/key reload remain unsupported.
- A client currently tracks one most-recent local UDP application peer, so
  concurrent local sources can replace the return target. Direct UDP
  keepalives are one-way; silent peer loss may require explicit reconnect or a
  local transport error to be noticed.

## Verification

The latest full gates passed on commit `586ff8f`, including the config and
client-ID changes:

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `cargo check --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `cargo test --all-targets --quiet` — 76 tests passed.

The tree was clean at this checkpoint. No uncommitted file inventory applies.

## Remaining work, prioritized

1. Add `tests/encrypted_runtime.rs` for daemon-level QUIC and TLS proof through
   the client runtime, encrypted transport, server runtime, and UDP echo
   backend. Cover auth rejection, session independence, control status/stats,
   and bounded shutdown. Lower-level transport tests are not a substitute.
2. Start fuzzing: `fuzz/**` and `docs/FUZZING.md` are unstarted. Cover packet
   parsers, authentication/framing boundaries, and malformed transport input.
3. Add benchmarks; benchmark targets and baselines are unstarted.
4. Decide a practical maximum datagram-size cap and justify it against transport
   overhead and MTU constraints; add boundary/config tests.
5. Decide whether config and certificate/key reload are optional or required by
   the spec/product scope. They are currently unsupported. Finish a final
   spec-to-implementation audit and update the acceptance checklist with
   evidence; do not claim unsupported behavior.

## First tasks for tomorrow

1. Implement the focused daemon-level QUIC/TLS test in `tests/encrypted_runtime.rs`,
   then run `cargo test --test encrypted_runtime -- --nocapture`.
2. Run the full gate sequence after the test lands:
   `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo check --all-targets`,
   `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`, and
   `cargo test --all-targets --quiet`.
3. Review the spec checklist, decide the datagram cap and reload scope, and
   record acceptance evidence plus the unstarted fuzz/benchmark work.