docs: record wgcloak v1 release state

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# Implementation and acceptance checklist
This is an evidence-based coordinator checklist. A checked item identifies
current code and tests; it is not a claim that the dirty worktree is an
unconditionally released artifact. The latest evidence was collected on
2026-09-19 with serial integration tests.
This evidence-based checklist records the implementation and license baseline
at commit `5767b90` (`release: finalize wgcloak v1 under GPLv3`). The final
documentation closeout is the only work that follows that baseline; the gates
below were run against the committed implementation. Package metadata and
`LICENSE` use SPDX `GPL-3.0-only`. Optional deferred work is called out
explicitly and is not treated as an unimplemented v1 transport.
## Milestones 1–6
@@ -31,12 +33,18 @@ unconditionally released artifact. The latest evidence was collected on
`tests/tls_tcp.rs`, `tests/integration_transports.rs`, and TLS cases in
`tests/encrypted_runtime.rs`; the TLS/TCP head-of-line tradeoff is documented
in `docs/PROTOCOL.md`.
- [ ] **6 — operational polish:** Control, validation, hardened systemd units,
capability guidance, deterministic benchmark assets, and fuzz targets are
present (`src/control.rs`, `tests/control.rs`, `packaging/systemd/`,
`benches/`, `fuzz/`). Leave this milestone open until final clean-checkout
gates, bounded cargo-fuzz runs, and the practical datagram cap decision are
recorded. Config/certificate reload remains explicitly unsupported.
- [x] **6 — operational polish:** Control, validation, hardened systemd units,
capability guidance, deterministic benchmark assets, fuzz targets, and
installation documentation are present (`src/control.rs`, `tests/control.rs`,
`packaging/systemd/`, `benches/`, `fuzz/`, `README.md`). The configured
default is 1,200 bytes and the validated project ceiling is 16,384 bytes.
Oversized-datagram metrics remain visible in aggregate status/statistics;
`src/server/mod.rs::record_transport_drop` and
`oversized_transport_error_is_counted_once` cover the latest repaired
boundary accounting.
Config/certificate reload remains explicitly unsupported; cargo-fuzz smoke
execution and environment-sensitive network benchmarking are optional
deferred validation artifacts.
## v1 completion criteria (spec §89)
@@ -73,8 +81,8 @@ unconditionally released artifact. The latest evidence was collected on
capability — `User=wgcloak`, hardening, and commented narrow
`CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` guidance in both `packaging/systemd/*.service` files.
- [x] 14. TOML configuration is clearly validated — `src/config.rs` tests and
`tests/server_capabilities.rs` cover role, transport, listener, and datagram
boundaries.
`tests/server_capabilities.rs` cover role, transport, listener, and the
1,200-default/16,384-ceiling datagram boundaries.
- [x] 15. Meaningful status and statistics are available — `src/control.rs`,
`tests/control.rs`, `tests/runtime_lifecycle.rs`, and aggregate-stat tests in
`tests/http3_runtime.rs`.
@@ -95,14 +103,15 @@ unconditionally released artifact. The latest evidence was collected on
- [x] Fuzz targets exist for direct packets, TLS frames, HTTP/3 parsing, and
TOML parsing, and `cargo check --manifest-path fuzz/Cargo.toml` passes.
No fuzzing execution or sanitizer result is claimed because `cargo-fuzz` is
not installed on the current host.
- [ ] `cargo test`, formatting, linting, and documented integration/bench
commands pass from a clean checkout. Current dirty-worktree evidence is:
`cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo check --all-targets`, strict all-target
Clippy, serial `cargo test --tests -- --test-threads=1` (95 passed), and
not installed on the current host; this is optional deferred validation.
- [x] Release gates passed against the committed `5767b90` implementation
baseline before this documentation closeout: `cargo fmt --all
-- --check`, `cargo check --all-targets`, strict all-target Clippy,
`cargo test --tests -- --test-threads=1` (100 passed),
`cargo check --manifest-path fuzz/Cargo.toml`, and
`cargo bench --bench protocol_transports --no-run`.
- [x] Review confirms no payload/secret logging, no unsafe privilege grant,
and no accidental WireGuard/routing/firewall coupling. Evidence:
`docs/SECURITY.md`, hardened systemd templates, source audit, and the
authentication/control/secret-file tests. This review does not waive the
clean-checkout and fuzz-execution items above.
authentication/control/secret-file tests. Config/certificate reload remains
an explicit unsupported optional feature.